I
naction is sometimes the optimal path-a point well taken by economists. In her substantial volume on optimal control, economist Nancy Stokey begins: "In situations where action entails a fixed adjustment cost, optimal policies involve doing nothing most of the time and exercising control only occasionally. " 1 When fixed adjustment costs exist, the investment profile over time tends to be characterized by sudden shifts followed by periods of complete inaction; economists often refer to this as a "lumpy" investment profile.
Much literature on information security focuses on how cybersecurity threats occur and how to best resolve them. However, additional factors, such as the risk environment, interdependent actors, attackers' reuse of exploits, and patching vulnerabilities contribute to chief information security officers' (CISOs') defense strategies.
Indeed, in many cases, the optimal decision is to wait until the degree of uncertainty changes and the benefits of action outweigh the costs.
The Defensive Investment Problem
CISOs typically ask two questions: How do we measure our return on security investment? And how, on an empirical cost-benefit basis, do we know when to patch, fix, or shut down systems and when new vulnerabilities arise? Both questions address optimal control problems in the presence of fixed adjustment costs. These costs might be known, or they may contain uncertain forward-looking components, and there is a tradeoff between these costs versus uncertain future gains.
It's difficult to measure return on security investment. The constantly evolving state of the "market for attacks" increases the difficulty in determining a security investment's true value. A firm's senior corporate officer rarely knows empirically (for instance, by audit) whether the firm has had no known security incidents because the firm:
■ is spending exactly the right amount on security; ■ is spending many times more than it needs; ■ is spending too little, but attackers haven't stumbled across its vulnerabilities or found it worthwhile to exploit them; or ■ is under attack but doesn't know it.
To determine a decision's optimal timing, much information is needed about the nature of uncertain future outcomes; for example, a security manager might wait to see if an exploit will be available for a vulnerability. However, managing cybersecurity investment receives less quantitative support than other typical risk-management activities undertaken by a firm. For instance, most firms actively manage interest rate and foreign exchange risk through their treasury management functions. These activities are carefully accounted for in corporate reports alongside their normal operational activities. Booked losses on hedging can be very large, but senior corporate officers and investors generally understand that it's important to hedge currency and interest rate risk, even if the specifics are hazy.
On the other hand, many CISOs struggle to procure an adequate budget until after a significant event has occurred. The decision to invest in a security fix or control appears to be increasingly well understood-for large technology companies at least. The decision process for the deployment of a patch is roughly as follows: ■ Determine the security flaw's severity and level of impact on the organization (possibly using the US National Institute of Standards and Technology Common Vulnerability Scoring System calculator). ■ Determine the danger of implementing a patch and how much testing is required to ensure that the patch is less destructive than the threat. ■ After weighing the first two steps, triage the update to either an immediate implementation or a regular update cycle.
In a case study on optimal patching, Christos Ioannidis and his colleagues, among others, postulated a quantitative tradeoff between the increasing risk of doing nothing and the deterministic cost associated with potentially incomplete mitigation. 2 Indeed, the patching problem is an archetypal fixed adjustment cost in a security setting; part of the objective of this article is to provide a consistent treatment of this problem. So, instead of management's failure to provide resources to underfunded information security departments being a catastrophic misstep, a delay in the implementation of security investment controls might be a sensible tradeoff between risk and investment. Many economic models suggest that the tactic of postponing updates might be gaining popularity-not because C-level employees are taking unreasonable risks, but because of an older, much more formidable foe: the tiny adjustments that drive us to the Nash equilibrium, wherein agents continually make choices as they strategize actions and respond to those of others.
In security decision making, we can model the Nash equilibrium problem using three groups of agents: attackers, firms, and government. Attackers decide to invest in a malware or hacking effort, firms in defensive security and regulations, and government in enforcement. Their payoff structures will differ.
For instance, hackers might value chaos over money, and firms and governments might value coverage in addition to a simple likelihood × impact calculation. Each will have its own subjective discount factors transforming future value of costs and benefits into risk-adjusted current values; therefore, the relative present valuation of costs and benefits will be idiosyncratic across the various agents in the economy.
Attackers' Economy
Agents working as attackers are economic actors with preferences-so who are the attackers, and what do we know about them? Prior security investment literature typically views attackers as essentially randomnumber generators. 3 Generators consider a set of vulnerabilities in commonly used software, firmware, and hardware and then throw malicious agents at this set. Eventually, technical proficiency and vulnerability combine to create a tool that can threaten the economic and physical well-being of the selected targets.
Looking at the relative scale of a threat versus the scale of investment to mitigate the threat, UN estimated in 2015 that global annual gross domestic product (GDP) was between US$60 and $80 trillion in 2014. 4 Estimates for the size of the cybersecurity industry are somewhat difficult to ascertain; in 2014, Gartner estimated that the cybersecurity industry accounts for approximately $77 billion-less than one-tenth of 1 percent of global GDP compared to conventional security expenditure on defense equipment and physical security, which is approximately 4 percent of the GDP at just under $400 billion. 5 On the other side of the attack-defense equation, our study examining transactions in a Russian online hacker market (which Google and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate accounts for a majority of online deployed malware tools) found that transaction sizes are quite low, often in the hundreds of dollars, and only rarely in the tens of thousands. 6 Although the underground hacker market appears to be a well-functioning economy, it is potentially significantly smaller than the opposing security industry.
Of course, the unit of account for losses might differ dramatically from the unit of account for rewards. If we look at insurance claims against cyberattacks from industry surveys, the claims from US firms are similarly very small; between 2011 and 2013, the median claim was $750,000 and the high was $13.5 million. This individual claim represented approximately 10 percent of total claims made. 7 What do we take from this? The data on the insurance market and our understanding of the level of available coverage is incomplete. However, if the level of actual damage is so small, then the balance of investment and coverage would indicate an economic puzzle that deserves more research.
Attackers' Motivation
An additional puzzle comes from a study exploring the menus of A delay in the implementation of security investment controls might be a sensible tradeoff between risk and investment.
www.computer.org/security vulnerabilities in attackers' malware kits, concluding that attackers are in fact, lazy. 8 Owing to the costly effort in developing new tools, attackers persist with malware based on existing vulnerabilities, long after effective patches have been introduced to the market, as opposed to exploiting new vulnerabilities in the systems. Fixed costs appear to make attackers' investment decisions as similarly lumpy as those investment decisions undertaken by their potential targets.
Another interesting facet of cyberattackers is their psychological profile and self-perception in terms of criminality, which affects software engineers' decisions to deploy labor for legal productive efforts or those deemed illegal. Attackers appear to be able to switch liberally between standard software engineering projects and those that would normally be deemed illegal. The criminology literature indicates that the profiles associated with a cyberattacker reveal a far lower persistence in offending; hackers choose to do work they feel is optimal for their own welfare rather than identify themselves by the offending activity. 9, 10 Although this is somewhat unhelpful for quantitative work, we can reasonably conjecture that the pool of threats that the security industry faces is uncertain. If attackers' fixed costs change, we could see a sudden and dramatic increase or decrease in attack intensity, with little way to predict such shifts. As we discussed, because of a lack of robust historical data on attackers and their behavior, each observation might be the result of an equilibrium formed from a very different experiment. Identifying causal relationships directly from data is an inherently fraught process, and the lack of detailed understanding of the attacker production function compounds this problem (for more information, see the "Econometrics" sidebar).
Externalities and Dependencies
How do firms' operational-level micro security decisions aggregate to the macro and hence the public policy level? Aggregation brings certain benefits as idiosyncratic impacts from events on single firms even out. However, public policy mandates on security policy must be implemented at the micro level, and inappropriately onerous requirements could generate costs for the productive side of the economy that are potentially unwarranted and almost certainly unfair. The cybersecurity literature is starting to demonstrate an emerging awareness of issues that arise when companies have the ability to control both the risk-generating mechanism and the source of contingent compensation in the event of a breach. 11 Ranjan Pal and his colleagues illustrated this problem by devising a model in which a security vendor provides both a monopoly service and a monopoly provision of insurance, and the combined monopolies generate a substantial profit.
In a network of firms, the provision of security has several dependencies, both indirect and direct (that is, through direct technical interconnections, such as shared data facilities and electronic communications networks for financial institutions). Direct connections have been studied extensively in the recent literature, whereas indirect connections are a more recent research interest. For a classic description of the interdependency problem in security, see "Interdependent Security," 12 and for a full network game with contagion, see Network Security and Contagion. 13 Indirect connections address the risk environment. This is the change in a firm's risk profile due to the choices of other firms in the network-not through direct linkages but due to changes in the overall number and intensity of attackers as a result of their perceived returns on investment. The provision of public goods in networks has been the subject of significant interest in recent research. 14, 15 From a security perspective, it's important that investment has a public good component in addition to the private benefits to the firm.
Econometrics
I n econometrics, we often seek to identify exogenous and endogenous variables in a system of regression equations. Exogenous variables refer to regressors that are uncorrelated with the noise term inherent in the regression. Endogenous variables exhibit some level of correlation with the noise term. For instance, if an explanatory variable in one regression equation is an independent variable in another regression, it is an endogenous variable within the system of equations.
Several empirically driven approaches, such as the use of linear and nonlinear instrumental variable regressions, have been proposed to correct for the identification issues inherent in empirical models in which knowledge of the underlying process is not well understood. Evidence from a broad range of micro-econometric studies has illustrated that the exclusion of appropriate instrumental variables from empirical models can result in highly misleading inferences. See chapters 9 and 10 of Badi Baltagi's book for a good summary of endogeneity, instruments, and multiple equation modeling in regression analysis. 1 A good is considered public if it is nonrival and nonexcludablethat is, the good is enjoyed simultaneously by an unlimited number of consumers, and it is impossible to prevent others from gaining free access to the good. Note that only aspects of security have a common property through the aggregate effect on attackers' expected payoffs. Moreover, it might be more appropriate to consider aspects of security to be closer to a common property good-that is, the cost of exclusion in consumption of security investment is very high-as opposed to impossible in the pure public good case.
Applying this idea, it seems that if I increase my effort in an activity and it has a positive spillover effect to you (for example, I invest in more security and discourage a small amount of the aggregate number of attackers, thereby reducing my own risk), then all agents in my network will engage in this virtuous cycle until a Nash equilibrium is reached. (Note that this might not be as desirable as a coordinated action mediated by policymakers). However, consider the patching problem for network or client software. Many firms' information platforms' modular components are specialized and interconnected. Applying a patch in one system might have unintended consequences for other systems (for instance, if a vendor drops legacy support). As such, patches commonly need to be tested, particularly for critical systems. This means that applications of patches have fixed costs, and as we ramp up these fixed costs, the degree of patching coverage drops, and the firms in an economic network suffer through the interdependency in security as we forestall or neglect investments at critical points. This risk does not stem from direct interconnections but via the attractiveness for attackers to invest in attacks that often have very little specific targeting other than a certain platform or a vulnerable library still used in a legacy system. Even though the attack might not have been particularly profitable to the attacker, the damage to the firm might still be quite severe.
The lumpy investment profile is also reflected in the security interdependencies with other firms; more important, the lumpy profile of a large firm can be felt across the network either directly or indirectly. Indeed, this observation formed the basis of early research on the importance of liability sharing in security patch management. 16 Hence, fixed costs appear to exaggerate already problematic issues of externalities, transmitting costs between firms, and form the basis of our conjecture that unpredictable investment generates excess aggregate security threats. If attackers can expect to make a good profit because somebody out there is unpatched, they will continue to invest time and effort in their current technology before switching to a new one.
Thus, the opportunity set and expected reward for attackers is formed from the aggregation of all unpatched vulnerabilities, many of which will be the result of small delays in investment. Hence, there is potentially a feedback mechanism sustaining firms' risks beyond the process of new vulnerability discovery.
W aiting to invest in cybersecurity might be deemed a poor risk management strategy, despite many standard models indicating that delaying investment until the nature of the uncertainty is clear is often the most appropriate course of action. A manager investing in cybersecurity infrastructure must determine the costs of inaction (which might be a function of accumulating risks) versus the cost of action (which might be fixed or have a random forward-looking component). These optimal control problems will likely depend on the joint decision making of all actors in a security context. This is in contrast to models of optimal decision making that treat a threat as a random external event in their environment (that is, an emergent risk). Furthermore, if attackers have the same type of investment decision making problem (upfront, fixed investments and continuous variable costs), we might find that the adjustment path for the intensity of attacks on firms increases the unpredictability of associated risks. Ergo, small changes in regulatory policy could lead to substantial unexpected changes in the threat environment. Read it Today! www.computer.org/multimedia
